Norway was concerned over ‘ugly’ anti-Norway campaign by JVP - Wikileaks

Norway was increasingly concerned about and exasperated with the escalating ‘ugly’ anti-Norwegian rhetoric orchestrated by the JVP in 2004 against their role in the peace process and the SLMM, according to the latest US Embassy cable released by wikileaks reveal.

 

The cable adds that the situation was exacerbated by then President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s reluctance to pull the JVP into line.

 

“Brattskar said he and Oslo were becoming increasingly concerned about and exasperated with the escalating anti-Norwegian rhetoric (also directed against the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, “SLMM”) which is clearly being orchestrated by the JVP. Oslo is also “fed up” with the GSL´s “lukewarm” response to the JVP campaign.”

 

The Cable recants what the then Norwegian Ambassador in Colombo Hans Brattskar told the co-chairs in Tokyo, “Brattskar noted that LTTE leader Prabhakaran, in his November 27 Hero’s Day speech (septel) had commented extensively on how the JVP position was, in the LTTE view, a major stumbling block on the road back to the peace table. Brattskar commented that he finds it increasingly difficult to explain the JVP´s activities and the southern political situation in general to the LTTE. They think I´m a fool.”

 

Full Cable;

 

 

11/29/2004 10:36

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001919

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR DORMANDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: NORWEGIANS CONCERNED BY JVP-ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN

AGAINST THEM

REF: COLOMBO 1862

Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 1.4 (b,d)

 

1. (C) Summary. The Norwegians are increasingly concerned

by an ugly JVP-orchestrated campaign against their role in

the peace process. The situation is exacerbated by President

Kumaratunga,s reluctance to pull the JVP into line. The

Co-Chair consensus here is that a group call on the Foreign

Minister and/or the President to make clear our support for

Norway and to urge that the JVP,s role in the government be

clarified would be appropriate. End Summary.

 

2. (C) The Tokyo co-chair chiefs of mission were convened

November 29 by Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda. Norwegian

Ambassador Hans Brattskar and Dutch Ambassador Susan

Blankhart attended. DCM represented the U.S. Suda said he

had felt it wise for the co-chairs to meet and discuss the

increasingly ugly anti-Norwegian campaign being orchestrated

by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and turned the floor

over to Brattskar.

UGLY CAMPAIGN

-------------

3. (C) Brattskar said he and Oslo were becoming increasingly

concerned about and exasperated with the escalating

anti-Norwegian rhetoric (also directed against the Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission, “SLMM”) which is clearly being

orchestrated by the JVP. Oslo is also “fed up” with the

GSL´s “lukewarm” response to the JVP campaign. Brattskar

shared copies of two documents. The first was a petition

handed over during a November 24 demonstration at the

Norwegian Embassy. The contents, Brattskar noted, were

fairly predictable: Norwegians too &friendly8 with the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the SLMM &does

nothing8 to prevent LTTE murders, etc. The interesting

parts, Brattskar noted, were the letterhead and signatories.

The petition from the &Forum of Political Parties and Civil

Organizations against Political Killings and Abductions8 was

signed by the anti-LTTE Tamil Eelam People´s Democratic Party

(EPDP), the JVP, the anti-LTTE Tamil Eelam People´s

Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the JVP-aligned

National Bhikku Front, the National University Teachers,

Alliance and a few other small groups. There was also a

signature line for breakaway LTTE faction leader Karuna,s

party (the TIVM), although there was no signature. Brattskar

said he had no doubt that the exercise had been organized by

the JVP. He took a dim view of the fact that two member

parties (the EPDP and the JVP) of the ruling coalition had

signed the document.

4. (C) The second document was a letter (which the

Norwegians do not intend to make public) to Brattskar from

JVP Secretary General Tilvin Silva in response to Bratskar,s

efforts to meet with the JVP leadership in order to explain

the Norwegian role and the activities of the SLMM. (As noted

in reftel, Brattskar has seen several JVP personalities in

their ministerial roles but has not been able to obtain a

meeting with the political leadership.) The letter is indeed

insulting. It refers to Norway as &a relatively

insignificant country8 (Brattskar laughingly commented,

&They,re right about that!8) It accuses Norway of active

support and training for the LTTE Sea Tigers (an old canard

that resurfaces periodically in the media), of pursuing an

agenda of active support for the LTTE against the GSL

(&aiding and abetting Tiger terrorism in devious ways in the

name of facilitating peace and thus white washing crimes

against humanity including forced conscription of children8)

and participating in LTTE propaganda efforts. The letter

says, due to these &examples8 of Norwegian connivance with

the LTTE, &The Norwegian Government has thus openly

contravened the United Nations Resolution 1373 of 2001

relating to the suppression of terrorism.8 The letter

concludes with the statement that Norwegian actions

&demonstrate the total lack of our Government,s confidence

in you. In these circumstances, a meeting with you at this

stage will serve no useful purpose.8

ACTIVE CAMPAIGN AROUND THE COUNTRY

----------------------------------

5. (C) Brattskar stated that the JVP clearly is

orchestrating a campaign around the country. He had recently

taken separate trips to Hambantota in the deep south and to

Kandy and the &cultural triangle.8 On both trips, there

had been clear indications of such efforts and, Brattskar

said, many of those with whom he met described the JVP

campaign in detail. He also noted that the JVP member of

Parliament in Trincomalee had publicly stated he was

organizing a campaign against the SLMM office there, which

Brattskar described as &worrying.8

GOVERNMENT,S POSITION UNCLEAR

-----------------------------

6. (C) Brattskar said, after noting the reference to &the

Government,s8 loss of confidence in the Norwegians, he had

written to Foreign Minister Kadirgamar stating that he would

assume that the JVP assertion in this regard was in error

unless he was advised otherwise by the GSL. There has been

no response. Brattskar noted that &we,ve all heard8

Kadirgamar,s now-standard view that the JVP is not cause for

concern since he is &bringing the boys along8 and slowly

turning them to a more centrist position. Brattskar said he

could certainly understand the need for the JVP to &blow off

steam8 if the party was slowly headed in the right direction

on the peace process. That is not the case. Rather, the JVP

is engaging in ugly rhetoric while heading in absolutely the

wrong direction on the peace front. Brattskar noted that

LTTE leader Prabhakaran, in his November 27 &Hero,s Day8

speech (septel) had commented extensively on how the JVP

position was, in the LTTE view, a major stumbling block on

the road back to the peace table. Brattskar commented that

he finds it increasingly difficult to explain the JVP´s

activities and the southern political situation in general to

the LTTE. &They think I´m a fool.8

7. (C) Brattskar said he will continue to seek clarity from

and make his frustration known to the GSL. He opined,

however, that President Kumaratunga will be unwilling to make

the JVP toe the line (although, according to what Brattskar

had heard, she is privately &furious8 with the JVP,s

actions) since her highest preoccupation these days is with

ensuring her political and parliamentary future. She

apparently has not talked to the JVP for over a month.

Exacerbating the situation, Brattskar said, are opposition

leader Ranil Wickremesinghe,s public comments over the

weekend that his UNP party will no longer support the

President in the peace process. This stems from UNP pique

over the recent financially induced defection of a party

member to the President,s coalition (with more such

defections rumored to be in the offing).

CO-CHAIR ACTION DISCUSSED

-------------------------

8. (C) Ambassador Suda said he thought that the co-chairs

needed to make clear to the government that the JVP-led

anti-Norwegian campaign is unacceptable. Co-chair reps

debated whether it made more sense to first see FM Kadirgamar

as a group or to seek a co-chair meeting directly with

President Kumaratunga (since the FM,s response would be

predictable). Brattskar said he wanted to talk quietly with

the GSL first and also needed more time to talk to Oslo. He

also said he wanted to get a readout on Norwegian peace envoy

Solheim,s December 1 meeting with LTTE luminary Balasingham

in London before undertaking any new initiatives here. All

agreed that they would consult with capitals with an eye

toward some sort of joint co-chair activity here in Colombo

towards the end of the week. Brattskar said he might not

join since Norway would be the topic of discussion.

COMMENT

-------

9. (C) Brattskar is right. The tone of the JVP-orchestrated

campaign is ugly and beyond the pale. We agree with him that

it is much more than &blowing off steam.8 With the

Department,s concurrence, we will be ready to participate in

a co-chair call on either the Foreign Minister or the

President later in the week (we think going directly to CBK,

who is just back from Iran, makes the most sense). We

believe the theme of the co-chair presentation should be that

Norway and the SLMM have our full support, that the GSL needs

to make clear that the JVP does not speak for the entire

government, that it is extremely confusing when two coalition

parties sign a petition condemning the Norwegian role in the

peace process (in direct contradiction of the President,s

public statements) and that the current situation of the JVP

being &in8 the coalition on some issues but &out8 on

others is having a deleterious effect on the peace process.

The unknown, of course, is whether the President is willing

to bring the JVP to heel when the party is crucial to her

ongoing political machinations regarding her political future

which, we fear, are at present a higher priority than the

peace process. End Comment.

LUNSTEAD